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From the Bankruptcy Courts
Benjamin Weintraub* and Alan N. Resnick**

EIGHTH CIRCUIT PROTECTS
SELLER'S RECLAMATION RIGHTS
IN CHAPTER 11 DESPITE
FLOATING LIEN ON BUYER'S
INVENTORY: THE PLAN
DRAFTING LESSONS OF PESTER
REFINING

A vendor who sells goods in the
ordinary course of business to an
insolvent buyer shortly before the
buyer files a bankruptcy petition
may be protected by the right of
reclamation afforded under UCC
Section 2-702. If certain requirements are met, Section 546(c) of the
Bankruptcy Code will insulate the
vendor's reclamation rights from
the avoiding powers of a trustee or
debtor in possession. So long as the
seller makes a written demand for
reclamation within ten days after
receipt of the goods by the buyer,
Section 546(c) requires that the
court protect the right to reclaim by
either ordering the return of the
goods, granting the seller's claim
administrative priority under Sec* Special Counsel to the law finn of
Kaye Scholer, Fierman, Hays & Handler,
New 'York, N.Y.; member of the National
Bankruptcy Conference.
.
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tion 503(b) of the Bankruptcy Code,
or securing the seller's claim by a
lien.
Section 2-702(3) of the UCC provides that a seller's right to reclaim
is "subject to the rights of a buyer
in the ordinary course or other good
faith purchaser.'' Courts have held
that a secured creditor of the buyer
who has a security interest in all the
buyer's inventory may qualify as
such a good faith purchaser. That
is, the presence of a floating lien on
the buyer's inventory could adversely affect the rights of the reclaiming seller because its reclamation rights are "subject to" the
rights of the lienor. However, as
illustrated in the opinion of the court
of appeals in In re Pester Refining
Co. , 1 the extenno which the presence of a floating lien on the buyer's
inventory impacts on the seller's
right to reclaim, even when the
floating lienor is undersecured, may
depend on the provisions of the
chapter 11 reorganization plan that
deal with treatment of the secured
creditor's claim.
The Facts
Ethyl Corporation delivered
6,000 gallons of a gasoline additive
1
In re Pester Ref. Co., 964 F.2d 842
(8th Cir. 1992).
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in a railroad tank car and twelve
fifty-five gallon drums of an antioxidant to the refinery of Pester Refining Co. on February 19 and 22,
1985. Ethyl billed Pester $126,995
for these credit sales, but did not
receive payment because Pester
filed a chapter 11 petition on February 25. Only two days later, Ethyl
made a written demand for reclamation of the goods under Section 2702 of the UCC and Section 546(c)
of the Bankruptcy Code.
Although the goods were still in
Pester's possession and were identifiable at the time of the reclamation
demand, they were also subject to
perfected security interests of several secured creditors of Pester whose
secured claims exceeded the value
of all of Pester's assets. The total
amount owed to secured creditors
with liens on the debtor's assets,
including its inventory, exceeded
$42 million. Pester refused to return
the goods and Ethyl filed a complaint commencing an adversary
proceeding for reclamation under
Section 546(c) of the Bankruptcy
Code.
More than a year after commencement of the chapter 11 case,
and while Ethyl's reclamation proceeding was still pending, the bankruptcy court confirmed a plan of
reorganization for Pester and affiliated debtor companies. The plan
provided that each reclaiming seller
shall have the choice of either settling or pursuing its reclamation
claim. Ethyl did not settle its claim.
After the trial of the adversary
proceeding, the bankruptcy court

upheld Ethyl's right of reclamation,
entered judgment in the amount of
$126,995, and directed that Ethyl
could pursue its judgment remedies
under state and federal law in the
event that Pester did not pay. The
district court affirmed this ruling
and Pester appealed.
The Statutory Framework
The court of appeals noted that
the seller's right to reclaim goods
delivered to an insolvent buyer, as
recognized under common law and
the pre-UCC Uniform Sales Act,
was available only if the seller could
prove that the buyer fraudulently
induced delivery by misrepresenting its solvency. The Uniform Commercial Code expanded the common-law remedy by allowing
reclamation without the need to
prove a misrepresentation of solvency in a narrow class of cases.
Specifically, UCC Section 2-702(2)
provides that "[W]here the seller
discovers that the buyer has received goods on credit while insolvent he may reclaim the goods upon
demand made within ten (10) days
after the receipt. ' ' 2 However, since
the seller, by delivering the goods
on unsecured credit, clothed the
buyer with apparent authority to
deal with the goods as its own, UCC
Section 2-702(3) adds that "[t]he
seller:'s right to reclaim under subsection (2) is subject to the rights of
2
964 F.2d at 844, quoting from U.C.C.
§ 2-702(2).
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a buyer in ordinary course or other
good faith purchaser. '' 3
As the court pointed out, " [s]ince
most secured creditors are good
faith purchasers under the UCC,
[Section 2-702] has the effect, in
priority terms, of placing the reclaiming seller behind the insolvent
buyer's secured creditors who have
security interests in the goods, but
ahead of the buyer's general unsecured creditors. '' 4
The right to reclaim under the
Uniform Commercial Code was the
subject of much controversy and
had caused great uncertainty regarding its effect under the pre-1979
bankruptcy laws, resulting in nearly
two dec~des of litigation between
bankruptcy trustees and vendors.
Congress responded with Section
546(c) of the Bankruptcy Code:
(c) ... (T]he rights and powers of a
trustee under sections 544(a), 545,
547, and 549 of this title are subject
to any statutory or conunon-law right
of a seller of goods that has sold
goods to the debtor, in the ordinary
course of such seller's business, to
reclaim such goods if the debtor has
received such goods while insolvent,
but
(1) such a seller may not reclaim
any such goods unless such seller
demands in writing reclamation of
such goods before ten days after receipt of such goods by the debtor;
and
3
U.C.C. § 2-702(3) refers to the rights
ofagood-faithpurchaserunderU.C.C. § 2403.
4
964 F.2d at 845.
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(2) the court may deny reclamation
to a seller with such a right of reclamation that has made such a demand
only if the court(A) grants the claim of such a

seller priority as a claim of a
kind specified in section 503(b)
of this title; or
(B) secures such claim by a

lien." 5

The court observed that Section
546(c) recognizes, with some limitations, the seller's state law right
to reclaim goods under UCC Section 2-702, but also grants the bankruptcy judge broad power to substitute a lien or an administrative
expense priority claim for the seller's right to reclaim possession.
''This remedial discretion allows
the court to leave the goods in the
debtor's possession to facilitate
Chapter 11 reorganization. It also
provides flexibility in enforcing secured creditors' superior rights. " 6
Ethyl's Right to Reclaim in the
Face of Floating Liens
The court found that Ethyl satisfied the statutory prerequisite for
reclamation under Section 546(c)
and the Uniform Commercial Code.
Ethyl sold the· goods in the ordinary
course of business, Pester received
the goods while insolvent, Ethyl demanded the return of the chemicals
in writing within ten days after Pester received them, and .Pester was
still in possession of the chemicals
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6

11 U.S.C. § 546(c).
964 F.2d at 845.
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when it received Ethyl's reclamation demand.
However, the court also found
that Ethyl's right to reclaim is subject to the rights of good-faith purchasers. When Pester received the
chemicals from Ethyl, it owed $42
million to secured creditors with
perfected security interests in Pester's assets, including the chemicals. "It is undisputed that these
secured creditors were good faith
purchasers, and that their security
interests were undersecured when
Pester filed its petition for Chapter
11 protection. " 7
Pester took the position that the
presence of these secured creditors
with superior rights as ''good faith
purchasers" extinguished Ethyl's
right of reclamation entirely. Rejecting that argument as doing '' obvious violence to the statutory language,'' the court of appeals wrote
that "[i]n the UCC context, when
the right to reclaim is 'subject to'
the rights of secured creditors, that
means the right is subordinate or
inferior to the security interests, not
that it is automatically and totally
extinguished. . . . Therefore, after
the secured creditors' superior interests have been satisfied or released, the reclaiming seller retains
a priority interest in any remaining
goods, and in any surplus proceeds
from the secured creditor's foreclosure sale. " 8 Accordingly, the court
agreed with the district court's holding that Ethyl's right to reclaim was
7
8

/d.
/d. at 846.

not extinguished merely because
Pester had secured creditors with
perfected security interests in the
chemicals Ethyl sought to reclaim.
The court found support in the
decision of the Court of Appeals for
the Fifth Circuit in United States v.
West Side Bank. 9 In that nonbankruptcy case, a timely reclamation
demand was made by the seller,
but a secured creditor of the buyer
foreclosed and sold all the buyer's
assets, including the goods subject
to reclamation. The Fifth Circuit
held that the reclaiming seller retained a priority interest in any surplus proceeds traceable to the goods
explaining that ''this result is appropriate under the UCC whether the
reclamation right is viewed ·as an
Article 2 limitation on the secured
party's right to dispose of collateral,
as an Article 9 junior security interest, or as the debtor's ownership
interest in traceable proceeds. '' 10
The court of appeals in Pester noted
that "[t]o our knowledge, although
the case law is inconsistent in other
respects, Westside Bank's interpretation of the 'subject to' language in
[UCC § 2-702(3)] has been followed in every reported bankruptcy
decision that has considered the
question." 11
9

732 F.2d 1258 (5th Cir. 1984).
964 F.2d at 846.
11
ld. at 846. Pester argued, however,
that the decision in In re Coast Trading Co. ,
744 F.2d 686 (9th Cir. 1984), supported its
position that the mere presence of a secured
creditor with a security interest in the goods
extinguishes the seller's right to reclaim.
"But Coast Trading is distinguishable from
the above-cited cases in one critical respect-the seller had drop-shipped the goods
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Is the Right Worthless?
After concluding that Ethyl's
right to reclaim was subordinate to
the security interests of Pester's
creditors, but was not extinguished,
the court was confronted with another problem. "Determining that
Ethyl's right to reclaim exists is
easier than determining what it is
worth." 12 Pester argued that Ethyl's
reclamation right was worthless because the debt owed to Pester's secured creditors exceeded the value
of all of its assets when the chapter
11 proceeding was commenced. It
was Ethyl's position that it had the
right to recover its entire reclamation claim from any assets of the
reorganized debtor because the superior secured creditors' claims
were satisfied under the confirmed
chapter 11 plan of reorganization.
The court of appeals rejected both
of these positions "as inconsistent
with the delicate balance codified in
§ 546(c) of the Code." 13
The court again began its analysis
by focusing on state law. The court
noted that foreclosure on the goods
by an undersecured creditor who
then uses the entire proceeds to pay
down its secured debt has the effect,
under the UCC, of extinguishing
the seller's reclamation right. After
to the buyer's customer, so they were not in
the buyer's possession when reclamation
was demanded. Factually, this puts Coast
Trading in the mainstream of UCC cases
holding that the seller may only reclaim
goods in the buyers' possession." 964 F .2d
at846.
12
964 F.2d at 847,
13
ld.
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all the goods that were sold by the
seller and subject to reclamation are
foreclosed upon by the floating lienor, the seller has nothing more than
an unsecured claim for the purchase
price. However, if the secured creditor releases its security interest in
those goods, the seller may enforce
its right to reclaim. ''In other
words, in the non-bankruptcy context, the secured creditor's decision
with respect to its security interest
in the goods will determine the value
of the seller's right to reclaim. " 14
Based on the purpose of Section
546(c), which was the partial recognition of UCC Section 2-702, the
court reasoned that the treatment of
the seller's reclamation rights
should depend on the treatment of
the secured creditor's claim in the
chapter 11 case.
Thus, Pester's argument-that the
claim is worth nothing because the
secured creditors were undersecured
at the outset-ignores the freedom of
secured creditors in nonbankruptcy
contexts to relinquish all or part of
their security interests. And Ethyl's
argument-that the claim is worth
full value because the secured creditors have been satisfied-ignores the
possibility that they were satisfied by
the goods to be reclaimed, rather
than by other Pester assets, in which
case the right to reclaim would be
extinguished (rendered valueless)
under state law. 15
14Jd.
15
!d. The court noted that this distinction
was recognized in In re Video King of Ill.,
Inc., lOOB.R. 1008(Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1989),
although only in dicta in a pretrial opinion
denying cross motions for summary judgment.
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The court of appeals rejected a
literal application of Section 546(c)
that was adopted by the bankruptcy
court in its reasoning that Ethyl must
be given either a lien or administrative expense priority. If a seller has
a right of reclamation, Section
546(c)(2), read literally, permits the
court to deny actual reclamation
only if the court grants the claim
administrative priority or secures
the claim by a lien.
When there are goods or traceable
proceeds available to reclaim, the
alternative remedies in § 546(c)(2)
provide needed flexibility. But when
the secured creditors have satisfied
their claims out of the goods to be
reclaimed, granting § 546(c)(2) relief would afford the reclamation
seller something it does not have under the UCC-a priority interest in
the buyer's assets other than the
goods to be reclaimed .... Nothing
in the text or legislative history of
§ 546(c) suggests that Congress intended to expand the state law rights
of reclamation sellers at the expense
of the bankrupt's unsecured creditors. In this situation, the bankruptcy
court does not 'deny reclamation'
in recognizing that the reclamation
right no longer has value; therefore,
the
alternative
remedies
of
§ 546(c)(2)donotcome into play. " 16

Plan Provisions Control
Since Ethyl's right of reclamation
existed when the chapter 11 petition
was filed, but was subject to being
rendered valueless by the actions of
Pester's secured creditors, the court
16

focused on the provisions of Pester's confirmed reorganization plan
to determine the manner in which
various classes of creditors shared
in the debtor's assets.
The plan provided for the transfer
of Pester's refinery assets, including the chemicals subject to Ethyl's
reclamation rights, to another entity
in exchange for fifty-four self-service gas stations. The plan also restructured Pester's debts. Although
the parties and the bankruptcy court
focused on the provisions of the plan
dealing with reclamation creditors,
the court of appeals focused more
on the plan's treatment of secured
creditors who had superior rights
in the chemicals Ethyl sought to
reclaim. "If the plan in fact satisfied
the claims of those creditors with
the chemicals, or their proceeds,
then Ethyl's right to reclaim would
be valueluess. '' 17
Under the plan, secured creditors
released their liens on Pester's
assets, including any chemicals.
This was an essential provision
since those assets were being conveyed to another entity. Their secured claims were deemed satisfied
by the plan and they waived any
deficiency claims, in exchange for
cash, notes, and stock from nine
sources. Most significantly, the distribution to secured creditors included any proceeds from a pending
lawsuit after the first $300,000 is
paid to the settling reclamation creditors.
17

964F.2dat847.
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of the amount fmally determined to
be due by Court order. " 19 In fact,
the plan expressly contemplated the
bankruptcy court judgment after
sustaining Ethyl's reclamation
claim.

From the terms of the plan, the
court concluded that the secured
creditors elected to release their security interests in the chemicals delivered by Ethyl in exchange for
payments from sources other than
the proceeds from those chemicals.
"Because the secured creditors released their superior liens and satisfied their claims from unrelated
assets and income sources, the
bankruptcy court properly valued
Ethyl's right to reclaim at the full
invoice price of the chemicals." 18
The court of appeals also rejected
Pester's argument that Ethyl was
estopped from asserting any right
it had to the alternative remedies
allowed by Section 546(c) because
the confirmed plan, as explained in
the disclosure statement approved
by the bankruptcy court under Section 1125 of the Bankruptcy Code,
expressly excluded reclamation
claimants from administrative expense priority. To the contrary, the
appellate court agreed with the
bankruptcy court's analysis of these
documents, noting that the plan expressly provided that reclamation
claimants who did not settle their
claims ''will receive payment in full
18
/d. The court of appeals rejected Pester's argument that the district court erred
in valuing the chemicals at Ethyl's invoice
price, instead of a lower fair market value.
"The court's finding that Ethyl's invoice
prices were the fair market prices for the
chemicals is not clearly erroneous. A reclaiming seller under§ 546(c) is entitled to
more than the 'garage sale' price its goods
would bring if resold not in the ordinary
course of business." See In re Performance
Papers, Inc., 119 B.R. 127, 130 (Bankr.
W.D. Mich. 1990)." 964 F.2d at 848 n.8.

Postconfirmation Interest
Ethyl sought postjudgment interest from the date of confirmation of
the plan of reorganization, but the
bankruptcy court denied the request
because UCC Section 2-702 does
not provide for the payment of interest. The court of appeals, however,
noted that issues regarding postjudgment interest in federal suits are
governed by federal law, not state
law, even if the action is otherwise
governed by state law. A federal
statute provides that ''interest shall
be allowed on any money judgment
in a civil case recovered in a district
court.' ' 20 The court of appeals held
that, because a bankruptcy court is
part of the district court, this statute
applies in bankruptcy proceedings.
The court of appeals agreed with
the bankruptcy judge's finding that
most decisions of other courts have
denied interest on reclamation
claims in bankruptcy cases, but distinguished those decisions as involving preconfirmation judgments
granting relief under Section 546(c)
for possession of the goods, administrative priority, or a lien. In this
case, the bankruptcy court entered
a postconfirmation money judgment
enforcing the provisions of the plan
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964 F.2d at 849.
28 u.s.c. § 1961.
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that stated that ''reclamation claimants will receive payment in full of
the amount finally determined to be
due by Court order,'' and that the
judgment would be enforced by
"remedies available ... under state
and federal law.' ' 21 Under these circumstances, the court of appeals
held that the plan did not contain
provisions overriding the normal
federal postjudgment interest provisions of28 USC Section 1961.
However, the court of appeals,
observing that the plan was silent
on the interest issue, held that Ethyl
was not entitled to interest from the
date of confirmation. "Here, the
Plan did not award Ethyl a judgment
on its claim; the Plan only saved
Ethyl's claim from discharge under
§ 114l(d)(l)(A). " 22 The court concluded that the plan provision calling for ''payment in full of the
amount finally determined to be due
by Court order'' contemplated that
postjudgment interest would accrue
on that court order. Accordingly,
Ethyl was entitled to interest from
September 19, 1990, the date of
the money judgment, and not from
March 21, 1986, the date on which
the plan was confirmed.
Conclusion
The lessons of the Pester case go
well beyond the particular facts of
that case. The decision serves as a
warning that the formulation of a
chapter 11 reorganization plan-especially regarding treatment of se21
22

964 F.2d at 849.
964 F.2d at 849.

cured creditors-could have a significant impact on the seller's right
to reclaim when faced with superior
rights of a secured creditor with a
floating lien on the debtor's inventory. If the plan provides that identifiable proceeds of the inventorywhether in the form of accounts
receivable, segregated cash collateral, or new inventory purchased
with cash collateral on consent or
with court approval-are to be used
to pay down the debt of the undersecured floating lienor, Pester appears to tell us that the seller's right
to reclaim under Section 546(c)
would be extinguished and the vendor would be treated as an unsecured nonpriority creditor. However, if the plan provides for release
of the floating lien, coupled with
a lien on other assets that are not
proceeds, payment from future operations of the business in general,
or the issuance to the secured creditor of debt or equity securities, the
reclaiming seller may be entitled
to at least administrative expense
priority as a requirement for confirmation. 23 In any event, the reasoning of the Pester decision must be
kept in mind by debtors and other
plan proponents when formulating
and negotiating the terms of a plan
of reorganization while faced with
both undersecured inventory lienors
and reclaiming sellers.
23
See 11 U.S.C. § 1129(a)(9), which
mandates, as a requirement for confirmation
of a chapter 11 plan, full cash payment to
each administrative expense priority claimant on the effective date of the plan, unless
the claimant agrees to a different treatment.
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